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THE REFORM OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
THEORY: A SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES
JAMES J. SCHESKE
I. INTRODUCTION
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES between multiple
tortfeasors has been the subject of much legal thought
and, more significantly, recent legislative action. The
most current popular movement in jurisprudence to
sweep across the nation is commonly known as "tort re-
form."' Virtually each state's version of tort reform in-
cludes changes in apportioning or comparing joint
tortfeasor responsibility. 2 This article attempts to charac-
terize the various approaches, focusing on the responses
affecting litigation involving the theory of joint and sev-
eral liability. Moreover, this article includes recommenda-
tions for a model joint and several liability statute and
concludes with discussions of alternatives to the current
tort system.
I The primary purpose of this comment is not to present a discussion of the
merits of tort reform or the evils of the insurance industry. This article includes
numerous references to the scholarly thought on these important issues. See, e.g.,
infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 63-175 for a discussion of state tort reform legislation; see also
Talmadge and Petersen, In Search of a Proper Balance, 22 GoNz. L. REV. 259, 260
(1986) ("It will be no surprise when the 1986 tort reform legislation does not
remedy the insurance crisis .... The only certainty surrounding this issue is that it
emanates from multiple factors.")
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Damage Apportionment
The principle of fault originally governed tort and acci-
dent law.3 In an ordinary negligence situation, the plain-
tiff shouldered the burden of proof. The court required
him to show that the defendant owed a duty, that the de-
fendant breached the duty, and that the plaintiffs injuries
were the proximate result of the defendant's breach.4 Be-
ginning in the late nineteenth century, two absolute bars
to plaintiff recovery in this type of scenario arose: contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of the risk.5
1. Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence became the ordinary defense
to negligence cases. 6 England first recognized contribu-
tory negligence in 1809 in Butterfield v. Forrester7 as a total
bar to plaintiff's recovery.8 By 1824, the theory had
reached the United States 9 where in various forms it be-
3 For a thorough discussion of the economics and jurisprudence of the tort sys-
tem, see Zwier, The Consequentialist/Nonconsequentalialist Ethical Distinction: A Toolfor
the Formal Appraisal of Traditional Negligence and Economic Tort Analysis, 26 B.C.L. REV.
905 (1985).
4 These elements comprise the basic tort of negligence. See, e.g., Himmler v.
United States, 474 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (general rules of duty and stan-
dards in tort apply to air crashes); Oban v. Bossard, 201 Neb, 243, 267 N.W.2d
507 (1978) (action remanded when connection between defendant-pilot's negli-
gence and airplane crash not established as a matter of law).
Concurrently, and not coincidentally, the industrial revolution was occurring.
Many courts may have been acting in an effort to protect growing industry. See
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1953).
6 James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE LJ. 691 (1953). Professor James stated
that "[iln an action based on negligence, the contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is a complete defense." Id.
7 Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). In the course of re-
pairing his house, the defendant had left a pole obstructing the highway. The
plaintiff did not see the pole in the dusk, and his horse threw and injured him. Id.
8 Vargo, Comparative Fault: A Need for Reform of Indiana Tort Law, 11 IND. L. REV.
829, 830 (1978).
s See Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). See generally W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. Contributory negligence was the
primary reason for denying recovery to plaintiffs. Vargo, supra note 8, at 831.
came the law in most states until the 1960's.10 The early
application of contributory negligence focused on the
person bringing suit. If the plaintiff was negligent in any
manner, his conduct totally barred recovery." To deter-
mine contributory negligence, courts used the objective
standard of a "reasonable person of ordinary prudence in
the same or similar circumstances.' 2  The burden of
proof belonged to the defendant.13
The theory did not apply, however, in all situations. If
the conduct involved an intentional tort, a violation of
statutory law, or conduct involving a "last clear chance,"
the plaintiff's actions did not preclude his recovery. 14
Many legal scholars, however, believed the contributory
negligence rule promoted more injustice than benefit. 15
Prosser stated that "[n]o one has ever succeeded in justi-
fying [contributory negligence] as a policy, and no one
ever will."' 6 According to Prosser, courts in the late nine-
teenth century used the doctrine to protect industry.' 7
to See Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151
(1946).
II PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at § 65.
2 Vargo, supra note 8, at 830.
"- PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at § 65.
14 Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L. REV. 465, 470-71 (1953); see, e.g.,
Pegram v. Pinehurst Airlines, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 738, 340 S.E.2d 763 (1986) (all
elements of last clear chance established by the plaintiff, including the failure of
airline employees to use reasonable care).
1- See, e.g., Lambert, The Common Law is Never Finished (Comparative Negligence on
the March), 32 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 741 (1968) (advocates an apportionment of dam-
ages rule to ensure adequate compensation); Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contrib-
utory Negligence, I ARK. L. REV. 1 (1946) (the comparative negligence doctrine is
destroying contributory negligence); Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L.J.
674 (1934). This final author states:
Unless one is willing to scrap not only the received conceptual appa-
ratus of causation, but a basic policy beneath it, it cannot reasonably
be said that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, at least
where this is foreseeable, severs the causal tie between the defend-
ant's misconduct and the plaintiff's injury .... The doctrine of con-
tributory negligence is not just.
Id. at 678, 708.
- Prosser, supra note 14, at 469.
17 Prosser stated:
Probably the true explanation lies merely in the highly individualistic
attitude of the common law of the early nineteenth century. The
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2. Comparative Negligence
The adoption of "comparative negligence"' 8 modified
the harsh effects of this all or nothing rule. Under com-
parative negligence, the trier of fact determined the rela-
tive percentages of fault of the plaintiff and defendant,
diminishing plaintiff's recovery accordingly. Thus, if the
plaintiff caused twenty percent of the damages, recovery
would be reduced twenty percent,' 9 resulting in a more
precise determination of each tortfeasor's culpability.2 °
Some commentators, however, questioned the jury's abil-
ity to effectively apportion damages.2 ' Others hailed the
period of development of contributory negligence was that of the
industrial revolution, and there is reason to think that the court
found in this defense, along with the concepts of duty and proximate
cause, a convenient instrument of control over the jury, by which the
liabilities of rapidly growing industry were curbed and kept within
bounds.
Id. at 468-69.
'8 See Vargo, supra note 8, at 838. See generally Goldberg,Judicial Adoption of Com-
parative Fault in New Mexico: The Time is at Hand, 10 N.M.L. REV. 3 (1979) (advocat-
ing comparative fault following New Mexico Supreme Court's retention of
contributory negligence); Wade, Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past,
Present and Future, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423 (1974) (recommending the switch to com-
parative fault in Tennessee).
'9 Vargo, supra note 8, at 838. This is "pure" comparative fault. Another vari-
ety is called "modified," wherein the plaintiff may recover only when his percent-
age is less than some arbitrary statutory limit. Proponents of the latter believe it
inequitable that recovery may be awarded to a plaintiff found more culpable than
a defendant.
Additionally, causation may play a role in the comparative scheme. See, e.g.,
Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Colo. 1984)("Comparative negligence
takes into account the negligence which caused the injury and reduces damages
proportionately.")
20 One court stated:
[Comparative negligence] is simply a more equitable system of de-
termining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss dis-
tribution. The injustice which occurs when a plaintiff suffers severe
injuries as the result of an accident for which he is only slightly re-
sponsible, and is thereby denied any damages, is readily apparent
.... When the negligence of more than one person contributes to
the occurrence of an accident, each should pay the proportion of the
total damages he has caused the other party.
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973).
' Professor Prosser stated:
The' question is Whether, upon the facts, it is possible to say that
each defendant is responsible for a separate portion of the loss sus-
tained. The distinction is one between injuries which are capable of
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movement as a deterrent promoting equity and justice. 22
A complete comparative fault scheme often included a
statutory right to contribution and indemnity for defend-
ants. Contribution allows a jointly and severally liable de-
fendant to seek compensation from his fellow tortfeasors
in an effort to redress possible overpayment.23 Toward
this end, the defendant's liability percentage is considered
the contribution limit.2 4 A contribution statute benefits
the defendant and more equitably apportions responsibil-
ity among joint tortfeasors. 25 Likewise, the concept of in-
demnity allows a defendant to shift the entire burden onto
a companion tortfeasor.2 6 However, contribution and in-
demnity remain distinct concepts.2 7
3. No-fault
During the 1960's new loss spreading concepts surfaced
in American tort law, giving momentum to no-fault based
systems.28 The common philosophy of these loss spread-
ing concepts was that defendants, not injured parties,
should absorb the loss caused by injury.29 Socialization of
being divided, and injuries which are not .... Entire liability is im-
posed only where there is no reasonable alternative.
Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 442-43 (1937) (ex-
ample omitted); see also Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 1985) (under Ala-
bama law damages are not apportioned; joint and several liability for the entire
award).
22 James, supra note 6, states that "[t]he logical corollary of the fault principle
would be a rule of comparative or proportional negligence, not the present rule
[of contributory negligence]." Id. at 704.
21 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.040 (1988).
24 Id.
25 See Brochner v. Western Ins. Co., 724 P.2d 1293 (Colo. 1986) (discussion of
Colorado's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
26 See generally Bohlen, Contribution and Indmnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL
L.Q. 552 (1936).
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (establishing modern law of products liability); see also
Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980) (misuse by the plaintiff
is not an affirmative defense); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d. 414
(Tex. 1984) (establishing pure comparative causation in cases involving defective
products--overruled by Texas tort reform legislation).
211 See, e.g., Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429 (discussing policy matters in Texas).
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risk was the policy force behind the development of no-
fault liability. With this scheme, the court could hold
the defendant liable without proof of causation. 31 As a re-
sult the no-fault concept increased the availability of re-
covery for the plaintiff. Legislatures and courts used the
development of no-fault liability to justify a restriction on
joint and several liability twenty years later. 2
The crises in insurance availability and affordability mo-
tivated the movement to reform the civil justice system
throughout the United States. 3 Certainly the issue is
controversial. 4 On the one hand a coalition of insurance
companies and large corporations allegedly formed a
powerful political coalition promoting reform of the tort
system to control escalating costs. 35 The Reagan Admin-
istration led the fight for reform as well. 6 In 1986 the
Department of Justice Tort Policy Working Group pub-
lished a report37 listing four problem areas which, in the
30 Id.
3, See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at § 98.
32 See infra notes 51-175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treat-
ment of joint and several liability in tort reform.
13 See McGovern, Capital Alert, 15 THE BRIEF 8 (1986) (a discussion of the Rea-
gan Administration's comprehensive report on the tort/insurance crisis).
31 Compare Schroeter and Rutzick, "Tort Reform" - Being An Insurance Company
Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 31, 33 (1986) ("Instead of
punishing the perpetrators, who are rich and powerful, the Legislature decided it
was time to punish the victims instead") with Herman, The Case for Comprehensive
Federal Tort Reform, 34 FED. B. NEWS &J. 125 (1987) ("[The American people] are
convinced that our civil justice system has broken down-and they are correct.
The hard evidence backs up these instinctual reactions.")
3-5 Badley, Why Tort Reform Was Needed in Washington, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 3, 5
(1986). He states that:
The coalition included corporations, government agencies, health
care providers, commercial insurance companies, self-insured cor-
porations and associations, health care provider-owner insurance
companies, trust funds, small businesses, professionals, and many
others. Uniting the coalition was the shared belief that expanded
civil liability doctrines were hurting the public, directly by increasing
insurance costs and reducing insurance availability, and indirectly by
undermining the availability of goods and services.
Id. at 5.
16 See, e.g., Willard, Troubling Trends In Our Civiljustice System and the Need For Tort
Reform, 34 FED. B. NEWS &J. 116 (1987). Serving as chairman of the Tort Policy
Working Group, Mr. Willard led the Reagan tort reform agenda.
.1 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
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Administration's view, have contributed significantly to
the insurance dilemma .3  In addition, the report con-
tained eight basic recommendations to "restore a sense of
balance to our tort law."'3 9 Among these were the elimi-
nation of joint and several liability in cases where the
tortfeasors did not act in concert. 40 The chairman of the
Tort Policy Working Group himself stated that "the ad-
ministration's tort reform proposals . . . have been suc-
cessful in changing the terms of debate over the past
year, ' 41 including an effort "to bring to the attention of
the courts the consequences of unwieldy judgments and
rulings. "42
Consumer advocates, 43 on the other hand, believe that
the increase in insurance rates comes not from the justice
CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986).
38 See McGovern, supra note 33. The problem areas listed are: (1) the move-
ment toward no-fault liability; (2) the decline of causation leading to the deep
pocket; (3) the large damage awards, especially non-economic; (4) the high trans-
action costs in the civil justice system. Id.
39 Willard, supra note 36, at 118.
40 Id. The remaining reforms were: (1) return to a fault-based standard for lia-
bility; (2) base causation findings on credible scientific evidence or opinions; (3)
limit non-economic damages, such as exemplary damages; (4) provide for peri-
odic damage payments; (5) reduce awards under the collateral source rule; (6)
limit contingency fees to reduce transaction costs; and (7) encourage the usage of
alternate dispute resolution techniques. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Claybrook, Consumers and Tort Law, 34 FED. B. NEWS &J., 127 (1987).
This commentator, formerly Administrator of the National Highway Safety Ad-
ministration, takes the insurance and litigation crisis head on. Her arguments
against tort reform are based on five points concerning our present system:
1. It compensates injured victims.
2. It deters misconduct that may cause injury and punishes wrong-
doers who inflict injury.
3. It prevents injury by removing dangerous products and prac-
tices from the marketplace.
4. It forces public disclosure of information on dangerous practices
and defective products otherwise kept secret.
5. It expands public health and safety rights in a world of ex-
panding technology.
Id. She concludes by saying "people don't sue for damages if they aren't injured."
Id. at 131.
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system, but from an insurance cycle." The lower interest
rates which have prevailed in the 1980's purportedly re-
sulted in less investment income for insurance compa-
nies.4 5 When investment income drops, the argument
goes, insurance companies sharply raise premiums, or
drop coverage of risky enterprises, to recoup the dispar-
ity. 4 6 Competition for insurance customers increases
when investment income is higher, thus premiums are
lowered to attract business.47 The cost of insurance rises
when the insurance company's capital and income are ad-
versely impacted. 48 Advocates of the current system be-
lieve that the unpredictability of insurance costs and tort
liability helps prevent injury by creating a deterrent ef-
fect.49 Ralph Nader, a well known consumer advocate,
stated that tort reform "is a degradation of the just norms
of the common law that have elevated care, redress, deter-
rence, and knowledge of perils into our nation's
consciousness." 50
A more thorough discussion of tort reform and other
changes in the civil justice system is beyond the scope of
this comment. Arguments for or against tort reform aside,
the treatment of joint and several liability reveals an im-
portant effect of the reform movement. This comment
now explores the various approaches states have taken to
the reform of joint and several liability.
44 See, e.g., Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights, 22 GONZ. L.
REV. 15, 18-19 (1986).
45 Id. Such an economic downturn, according to Mr. Nader, also occurred in
the mid-1970's.
46 Id.
41 Badley, supra note 35, at 13.
48 Id. Badley noted that insurance companies and corporate America believe
that a broadening of tort liability would have a much longer lasting effect on the
insurance industry than a phase of the "cycle." Id. at 14.
49 See Nader, supra note 44, at 21.
50 Id. at 29.
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III. STATE LEGISLATION AND JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY
A. Joint and Several Liability Defined
Joint and several liability originated as distinct theo-
ries. 5 1 The first to develop was joint liability: action in
concert or in conspiracy, proximately resulting in injury,
making the defendants liable together for the plaintiff's
damages.5 2 Over time, however, the rules of engagement
became more modern, and the procedural practice of
joinder caused confusion with. "joint liability. '" 53 When
the second theory of common several liability emerged,
joint liability evolved to become the joint and several lia-
bility common in present jurisprudence. Defendants clas-
sified as jointly and severally liable became liable for any
portion of the total judgement.54 Thus the plaintiff may
elect from which defendants to seek compensation - the
defendants face liability together or individually. 55 Occa-
sionally known as the "deep pocket theory,"' 56 joint and
several liability may entice claimants to seek payment on a
judgment from the wealthiest among the defendants.
Thus, under the theory of joint and several liability,
when only one of the defendants actually causes injury
and the defendant who caused the injury cannot be identi-
fied, each defendant who breached a duty of care owing to
the plaintiff must prove that he or she did not proximately
cause the plaintiff's injuries or face joint and several liabil-
ity with his or her codefendants. Typically the defendants
, Prosser, supra note 21, at 414.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 420-422.
54 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at § 52. "The question is primarily not
one of the fact of causation, but of the feasibility and practical convenience of
splitting up the total harm into separate parts which may be attributed to each of
two or more causes." Id.
-- See, e.g., id.; In re N-500L cases, 577 F. Supp. 825 (D.P.R. 1981), af'd, 691
F.2d 15 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (pilot 60% liable, airline 20% liable, F.A.A. 20% liable in
a crash of taxi aircraft); Corley v. Gene Allen Serv. Inc., 425 So. 2d 781 (La. Ct.
App. 1982) (owner and lessor of aircraft may be jointly and severally liable with
pilot for their own negligence).
-6 See Civiletti, Comments on Galanter, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 41 (1986).
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act independently. In a well known "alternative liability"
case, Summers v. Tice,57 two hunters negligently aimed and
shot in the direction of the plaintiff.58 During trial the
plaintiff could not positively identify which of the two
hunters proximately caused the injury. 59 The court held
both defendants liable and did not burden the plaintiff
with proving the particular guilty defendant. 60 Even
though the plaintiff could not prove which tortfeasor
caused the injury, public policy dictated that the plaintiff
should not be without remedy.6' The Restatement Sec-
ond of Torts adopted this rule.62
B. Joint and Several Liability and Tort Reform Legislation
1. States which have not acted or which have generally
retained traditional joint and several liability
For various reasons, some jurisdictions have elected not
to adopt any reforms in civil justice or adopted reforms
not affecting joint and several liability. Arkansas, for ex-
ample, does not have a statute specifically concerning
joint and several liability. Instead, a law exists in which
joint tortfeasors are not released when the plaintiff seeks
payment from only one.63 More importantly, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that defendants arejointly and sever-
17 Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
8 Id., 199 P.2d at 2.
Id.
o Id., at 5.
, Id., at 4.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B)(3) (1965). The language states:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but
there is uncertainty as to which one of them has caused it, the bur-
den is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.
Id.
63 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-203 (Michie 1987). "Nothing in [the Contribution
Act] shall be construed to effect the several joint tortfeasors' common law liability
to have judgment recovered and payment made from them individually by the
injured person for the whole injury .... " Id.
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ally liable in personal injury cases.64 The holdings of the
Arkansas courts reflect an adoption of traditional joint
and several liability theory.65 Delaware statutes imply
joint tortfeasor liability. 66 Idaho similarly implies liabil-
ity.6 7 The Idaho Supreme Court held that the legislature
intended to retain the common law rule of joint and sev-
eral liability. 6 The court also did not limit liability based
on proportionate fault.69
Georgia has a contributory negligence statute asserting
that defendants may be held either jointly or individually
responsible. 70  The Georgia Supreme Court outlined
Georgia's common law notions of joint and several liabil-
ity, for example, in a products liability case. 7' As yet, the
- See, e.g., Bill C. Harris Constr. Co., Inc. v. Powers, 262 Ark. 96, 554 S.W.2d
332 (1977). The court stated in part:
[W]hen the negligent acts of two parties combine to produce harm
they are jointly and severally liable ... and either one may be held
responsible for all .... [Moreover,] damages for the entire injury
may be recovered from all or any one of the joint tortfeasors ....
[The injured party] may sue each separately or join them as parties
defendant.
Id., 554 S.W.2d at 337 (citations omitted).
05 See, e.g., id.
' DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1986) (comparative negligence stat-
ute); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302 (Supp. 1986) (pro rata shares applicable in
the right of contribution). Moreover, Delaware uses "pure comparative negli-
gence." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1986). Rhode Island, on the other
hand, apparently retains common law joint and several liability. R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 10-6-2 (Supp. 1988).
67 IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (Supp. 1988).
00 Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603 P.2d 156 (1979). The court
stated "[a]t this time ... the adoption of our comparative negligence act... does
not require . . . [that] we find a legislative intent to so abolish joint and several
liability." Id., 603 P.2d at 164.
- Id., 603 P.2d at 164.
7o GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1984). That section states "[i]f the plaintiff by
ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the de-
fendant's negligence, he is not entitled to recover. In other cases the defendant is
not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the injury
sustained." Id.
71 Colt Ind. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980).
The language used by the court included:
If the separate and independent acts of negligence of two or more
persons or corporations combine naturally and directly to produce a
single, indivisible injury other than a nuisance, and if a rational basis
does not exist for an apportionment of the resulting damages among
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Georgia legislature has not entered the tort reform arena
with restrictions on joint and several liability.
In Kentucky, the statute purporting to extend a right of
joint and several liability originally applied only to tres-
pass cases. 72 Soon after its adoption, however, the Ken-
tucky' Supreme Court extended the language to include
personal injuries. 73 This is an example of the legislature
and courts acting together to adapt to the needs of both
the injured and the insured. For example, West Virginia
follows the traditional common law doctrine of joint and
several liability.7 4 West Virginia courts have likewise rec-
ognized joint and several liability through the state contri-
bution statute.75
Maine expressly retained joint and several liability
through its comparative negligence statute.76 The Maine
Supreme Court, in explaining why it held a personal in-
jury defendant jointly and severally liable, stated "[i]t
[was] entirely clear under the law in this state" that joint
and several liability_ applied.77 Massachusetts,78 Missis-
the various causes, then the actors are joint tortfeasors, jointly and
severally liable for the full amount of plaintiffs damages.
Id., 272 S.E.2d at 252 (citing Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453, 454, 211 S.E.2d 744
(1975)). For a recent case utilizing this language, see Thomaston v. Fort Wayne
Pools, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 541, 352 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1987) (personal injury case).
72 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985), entitled "Tres-
pass, joint or several damages for." This statute leaves the determination ex-
pressly to the jury. Id.
71 Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165
(1949).
74 See, e.g., Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
The court stated that "[n]either our comparative negligence rule nor [prior case
law] is designed to alter our basic law which provides for joint and several liability
among joint iortfeasors after judgment." Id. at 886. The case also presents a
good discussion of contribution and comparative negligence in West Virgina.
7- See, e.g., Haynes v. City of Nitro, 240 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1977) (concurrent
negligence creates joint liability).
76 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980). This statute also provides a pure
comparative negligence system. Id. Moreover, each defendant has the right to
request the jury, through use of special interrogatories, to separately determine
percentages of fault. Id.; see also Herrick v. Theberge, 474 A.2d 870 (Me. 1984)
(plaintiff's comparative fault bars recovery only if fault is at least equal to the
defendant's).
77 Atherton v. Crandlemire, 140 Me. 28, 33 A.2d 303 (1943) (automobile acci-
dent case). The court stated more fully "that each wrongdoer is liable for the
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sippi,79 Tennessee, 0  and Wisconsin 8 1 chose the same
manner of definition as Maine. 2 In 1980 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that the common law theory ofjoint
and several liability would not be abandoned.A3 The back-
ground of the Wisconsin joint and several liability rule
reveals several attempts to modify or repeal its effect.8 4
Without novel reasons, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
seems unlikely to overturn precedent.8 5
The Missouri state court system interpreted a contribu-
tion/release statute as giving plaintiffs a right to jointly
and severally liable defendants.8 6 Also, the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in a
wrongful death diversity case, found the air traffic control-
lers, the crew, and the airline manufacturer of a DC-9
jointly and severally liable by utilizing the contribution
statute to introduce the doctrine. 7 Maryland also recog-
nizes joint and several liability, not by any one specific
statute but rather by implication through a number of
whole amount of damage resulting from separate negligent acts which operate
together to cause damage to another ...." Id., 33 A.2d at 303.
'" MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 85 (Law. Co-op. 1986). The statute states in
part: "In determining by what amount the plaintiffs damages shall be diminished
in such a case, the negligence of each plaintiff shall be compared to the total negli-
gence of all persons against whom recovery is sought." Id.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also stated that "[if] two or
more are liable to an action, they are liable jointly and severally .... Eckstein v.
Scoffi, 299 Mass. 573, 13 N.E.2d 436, 438 (1938).
79 MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (contribution between joint tortfeasors);
see, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985) (joint tortfeasors are jointly
and severally liable to the plaintiff).
so TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-102 (1980) (right of contribution among
tortfeasors statute).
s, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983) (contributory negligence statute); see
also Delvaux v. Langenberg, 130 Wis. 2d 464, 387 N.W.2d 751 (1986) (approving
legislative adoption of pure comparative negligence).
"2 See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Maine law in
this area.
, Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & David Constr. Corp., 96 Wis. 2d
314, 291 N.W.2d 825, 834-35 (1980).
- Id., 291 N.W.2d at 833-34.
- Id., at 834-35.
116 State ex reL Landmark Kan. City Bank v. Stuckey, 661 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (interpreting Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1978)).
17 Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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statutes.88 This array of statutes makes the existence of
joint and several liability less obvious than, for example,
Michigan's legislation entitled "Pro rata shares of
tortfeasors."8 9 Michigan's law states that the right of the
injured person to a joint and several judgment shall not
be affected from a determination of pro rata responsibili-
ties. 90 Moreover, Michigan courts have held thatjoint and
several liability survived adoption of comparative negli-
gence. 9' Pennsylvania still recognizes the common law
joint and several liability law through its Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.92 Pennsylvania case law
supports joint and several liability as well.93 However, a
superior court held that liability and damages are to be
apportioned when acts of the original wrongdoer and
negligent defendants are separate from each other.94
Several states operate under the notion that a plaintiff
has the right to a joint and several judgment when the
plaintiff's percentage of responsibility is less than all de-
fendants.95 In Oklahoma, for example, joint and several
liability exists as in common law except for comparative
negligence cases.9 6 Thus, the Oklahoma legislature and
supreme court have not completely abolished the doc-
trine. An earlier version of the Oklahoma statute allowed
the court to hold that multiple tortfeasors may be only
severally liable if a jury can apportion fault among several
" See MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-21 (1979)(statutes dealing with contribu-
tion, indemnity, and releases). The definitional section explains joint tortfeasor
to mean "two or more persons jointly and severally liable .... Id.
89 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2925b (West Supp. 1988). For a thorough
discussion of Michigan tort reform legislation, see Shelton, Bishop, and Blaske,
1986 Tort Reform Legislation A Summary,66 MICH. B.J. 252 (1987).
- § 600.2925b.
91 See, e.g., Weeks v. Feltner, 99 Mich. App. 392, 297 N.W.2d 678 (1980).
92 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8322 (Purdon 1982).
93 See, e.g., Coyne v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 393 Pa. 326, 141 A.2d 830 (1958)
(streetcar passenger-automobile accident); General State Authority v. Sutter
Corp., 69 Pa. Commw. 504, 452 A.2d 75 (1982) (an action in assumpsit).
Harka v. Nabati, 337 Pa. Super. 617, 487 A.2d 432 (1985).
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1987) (but if an individual defendant's percent-
age of responsibility is less than the plaintiff, several liability only applies); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 1987).
ski See, e.g., Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980).
defendants .9
Other states, in a similar vein, have adopted joint and
several liability only when the plaintiffis responsibility, as
determined by the fact finder, is zero percent.98 These
statutes reflect a modification of the traditional common
law rule that the plaintiff recover nothing when he or she
has contributed to the injury. 99 Joint and several liability
applies in basically the common law form in Minnesota. 00
However, an exception exists for a municipality, which is
considered jointly and severally liable only for a percent-
age of the whole award not exceeding twice the dollar
amount of its fault.' 0 ' The legislature passed the munici-
pality provision as an amendment to the apportionment
statute in 1986.102 No other significant changes to joint
and several liability passed the legislature. 0 3 Shortly
before passage of the 1986 amendments, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reaffirmed the state's support of the doc-
trine in an asbestosis case.0 4 The court noted that the
comparative fault scheme retains joint and several liabil-
ity.105 The public policy in Minnesota reflects a choice be-
tween placing the burden of loss "on an innocent plaintiff
or on defendants who are clearly proved to have been at
fault."' 1 6 Minnesota chose the defendants. 0 7
97 See, e.g., Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978). The court relied
upon OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1977). Id.
98 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1985) (contributory negligence is no
defense unless plaintiff's causation is not slight).
See supra notes 3-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of common law
rules of apportionment.
too MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West Supp. 1988). "When two or more persons
are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage
of fault attributable to each, except that each is jointly and severally liable for the
whole award." Id.
lo, § 604.02(1). Additional exceptions were also added by the 1988 amend-
ments. Id.
102 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 note (West Supp. 1988).
1o3 Id. § 604.02.
- Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986). "It is a well-
established rule in Minnesota that parties whose negligence concurs to cause an
injury are jointly and severally liable." Id. at 292.
Io- d. at 292.
- Kowalske v. Armour & Co., 220 N.W.2d 268, 272 (1974).
to7 Id., at 273.
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2. States which enacted legislation affecting the doctrine of joint
and several liability
In 1986 and 1987, the "insurance crisis" or "litigation
explosion" prompted state legislatures to reform the civil
justice system. 0 8 The reasons and motivations for each
reaction were as varied as the resulting laws. In 1986, a
total of thirty five states enacted some type of tort re-
form. 10 9 Of these, only fourteen modified or abolished
the theory of joint and several liability."10 Three states
considered but did not adopt tort reform in 1986."' l The
following year saw additional legislative efforts, with nine
more states joining the tort reform movement, all altering
joint and several liability doctrines."l 2
Most jurisdictions did not completely abandon the com-
mon law concept of joint and several liability. Instead,
many lawmakers merely limited the application of joint
and several liability to specific factual situations, such as
litigation involving hazardous wastes or toxic tort inju-
ries." t3 Other states retained the doctrine for defendants
acting in concert."l 4 The Arizona bill states that it abol-
ishes joint and several liability except that (1) a defendant
is responsible for the fault of another if he acted in con-
cert; and (2) toxic torts or solid waste disposal litigation
may have joint and several liability imposed." 5 A defend-
108 See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origins
of the tort reform movement.
,09 Kelly, A Survey of Tort Reform in 1986, 14 BARRISTER 51, 52 (1987).
,o Id. at 52.
111 Id. at 52-54. This group of states was Alabama, Idaho, and Mississippi. Min-
nesota also made a minor change. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this change.
112 The states making changes in 1987 were, in alphabetical order: Arizona,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and
Texas.
,1- See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-10.9 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1117, 2-1118 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1988).
114 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENr, CODE § 32-
03.2-02 (Supp. 1987).
i" ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(A), (D) (Supp. 1987). Prior to the tort re-
form bill, joint and several liability was used widely in Arizona. See, e.g., Kriz v.
Buckeye Petroleum Co., Inc., 145 Ariz. 374, 701 P.2d 1182 (1985) (contribution
ant found jointly and severally liable retains a right to
contribution in Arizona. '1 6 Likewise, Hawaii abolished
joint and several liability for litigation not meeting certain
enumerated exceptions, ' 7 including an exception for
torts relating to aircraft accidents." 8 The distinction be-
tween economic and non-economic damages prevails in
Hawaii."19
Interestingly, Florida enacted significant tort legislation
in its 1986 session, 20 but Florida trial lawyers and the in-surance industry successfully litigated the matter to the
Florida Supreme Court.' 2' The fate of joint and several
liability was challenged on denial of access, due process,
and equal protection grounds.' 22 The Florida Supreme
Court held the joint and several liability provisions of the
tort reform legislation did not violate the U.S. or Florida
Constitutions. 123 The court also noted the legislative pol-
icy for joint and several liability reforms reflected the be-
lief that "the underlying basis for the doctrine no longer
exists."' 12 4 The court upheld most of the remainder of the
legislation, but it did rule that a $450,000 limit for non-
economic damages violated the plaintiff's right to access
in thecourts. 25
Illinois automatically imposes joint and several liability
for defendants whose fault is twenty-five percent or more
case using joint and several liability proportions); Fredericks v. Thunderbird Park,
118 Ariz. 165, 575 P.2d 364 (1978) (upheld application of joint and several liabil-
ity in fraud action against a bank).
116 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(E).
1" HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9. The exceptions are economic damages involv-
ing personal .injury or death, economic and non-economic damages involving (1)
intentional torts; (2) torts relating to pollution, toxicity, and asbestos; (3) aircraft
accidents; (4) strict and products liability; or (5) certain automobile accidents. Id.
1,o § 663-10.9(2)(D).
119 § 663-10.9.
12o FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1988).
"' Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987). This litigation
presented a broadly-based challenge to the new Florida tort reform legislation.
Id. at 1083.
22 Id. at 1090.
123 Id. at 1091.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1088-89.
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of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff. 126 A compan-
ion provision includes exceptions to this law, namely pol-
lution torts and medical malpractice actions.' 27  The
former section applies to any personal or property dam-
age case based on negligence, strict liability, or products
liability.'2 8 Commentary following the statute states that
the legislature passed these new rules in response to "the
insurance crisis."' 29  The effect makes defendants no
longer jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for all
damages. 3 0 North Dakota adopted a similar law in its
1987 tort reform legislation.13 1 Defendants face only sev-
eral liability unless they acted in concert or adopted ac-
tions for their own benefit. 3 2 However, the coverage of
this statute does not extend to products liability or other
strict liability cases. 133 The policy in North Dakota prior
to this new law favored the injured party by giving him the
option of waivability.13 4
Other jurisdictions also adopted joint and several liabil-
ity for tortfeasors when the liability percentages are at cer-
tain levels. 35 The state of Alaska, in a 1986 tort reform
126 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1117 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
127 Ch. 110, 2-1118.
128 Ch. 110, 2-1117.
'29 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (Historical and Practice
Notes).
1o Id. Illinois courts had followed joint and several liability for some time. See,
e.g., Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 530, 27 N.E.2d 53 (1940). Joint and several
liability arose "even though there is no common duty, common design or con-
certed action." Id., 27 N.E.2d at 55.
-' N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987).
132 Id.
1-1 Under the statute "fault includes negligence, malpractice, absolute liability,
dram shop liability, failure to warn, reckless or willful conduct, assumption of risk,
misuse of product, and failure to avoid injury." Id.
134 See Bartles v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 122 (N.D. 1979).
- See ALASK STAT. § 09.17.080 (Supp. 1987) (retains joint and several liability
unless defendant is less than 50% liable-then only jointly liable for up to twice
his percentage in dollar terms); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1117 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1988) (defendant jointly and severally liable when his percentage of fault is
greater than 25% for all expenses other than medical); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4
(West 1987) (abolishes joint and several liability when a defendant is less than
50% responsible); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West 1988) (joint and several lia-
bility with special rules for municipalities based on percentage of fault); TEx. Civ.
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bill, requires a defendant to have liability of fifty percent
or more to be jointly and severally liable. 36  Other
tortfeasors have limited joint liability. 37 Illinois operates
with a percentage for the defendant equal to twenty-five
percent of the plaintiff's fault.3 8  In Iowa, the common
law rule of joint and several liability does not apply to de-
fendants found to be less than fifty percent responsible. 3 9
Prior to passage of this reform, Iowa recognized the com-
mon law rule, including comparative negligence cases. 40
Also common is a more strict type of several liability
which holds defendants responsible only for their propor-
tional share of causation.141 Colorado provides a defend-
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (defendant greater than
twenty percent).
,5c ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (Supp. 1987).
117 Id. The statute states in part "that a party who is allocated less than 50
percent of the total fault allocated to all the parties may not be jointly liable for
more than twice the percentage of fault allocated to that party." Id.
13" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1117 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). "Any defendant
whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault
attributable to plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party
defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severably liable for
all other damages." d. However, defendants in actions involving medical mal-
practice or "the discharge into the enviornment of any pollutant" may still be held
jointly and severally liable. Id.
139 IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1987). The effective date of this provision
was July 1, 1984. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld this new joint and several
liability law in Johnson v. Junkman, 395 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1986).
140 See, e.g., Kopsas v. Iowa Great Lakes Sanitary Dist. of Dickinson County, 407
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1987) (notes retention ofjoint and several liability prior to new
statute); Glidden v. German, 360 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Iowa 1984) ("the plaintiff is
allowed to collect the fair amount of a verdict from all tortfeasors").
141 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h
(1987) ("liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable
... damages"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (Burns 1988) (plaintiff greater than
50%, a total bar to recovery; otherwise joint and severally liable); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-258 (Supp. 1987) (interpreted as abolishing the doctrine in Glenn v. Flem-
ing, 240 Kan. 724, 732 P.2d 750 (1987)); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West
Supp. 1988) (applicable to joint tortfeasors by Duplechain v. Clausing Mach.
Tools, 420 So. 2d 720 (La. Ct. App. 1982)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7a (1983)
and Sinonsen v. Barlo Plastics Co., Inc., 551 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1977) (joint and
several liability remains under this statute, unless recovery against two or more
defendants); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (1987) (several liability with exceptions);
N.Y. CIVIL LAw § 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.19(a)(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1987) ("no
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable to that defendant"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
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ant is only liable for the percentage of fault attributable to
the particular defendant.' 42 Traditional joint and several
liability was thus repealed in Colorado by the tort reform
measure adopted in 1986.'14  Nevada takes a similar ap-
proach. The Nevada legislature amended the compara-
tive negligence statute' 44 in 1987 to abolish joint and
several liability in all cases which do not fit into one of five
particular categories.' 45 New Mexico abolished joint and
several liability' 46 except for intentional torts, vicarious li-
ability, strict products liability, and "to situations not cov-
ered by any of the foregoing and having a sound basis in
public policy.' 47 Before the adoption of the New Mexico
statute, a New Mexico Court of Appeals favored abolition
of the doctrine due to inconsistency with the policies of
comparative negligence. 148 New York tort reform, on the
other hand, provides several Iiability in two scenarioIs.' 49
If a defendant is fifty percent liable or less, that defendant
is liable for his proportionate share, but only regarding
non-economic losses.' 5 0  Presumably, a defendant re-
mains jointly and severally liable for economic losses re-
(Supp. 1987) (uses a ratio of the defendant's negligence to the total negligence of
all defendants against whom recovery is sought); Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988).
The Wyoming provision states: "Each defendant is liable only for that proportion
of the total dollar amount determined as damages ... in the percentage of the
amount of fault attributed to him ...... §1I-l-109(d).
142 CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987).
143 Joint and several liability had been retained in Colorado even after a com-
parative negligence statute was adopted. See Martinez v. Stefanich, 577 P.2d 1099
(Colo. 1978) (contains a brief view of the law in other jurisdictions).
144 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1987).
145 § 41.141 (4)-(5). The language reads in part "except as otherwise provided
in subsection 5, each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only for that
portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributa-
ble to him." Id. § 41.141(4). The five categories where joint and several liability
applies are in actions based on (1) strict liability; (2) intentional torts; (3) toxic or
hazardous substance torts; (4) concerted actions; and (5) intrastate product liabil-
ity. Id. § 41.141(5). The effective date for these new laws was July 1, 1987.
14' N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-I(A) (Supp. 1988).
147 Id. § 41-3A-1(C).
148 Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
149 N.Y. CIVIL LAw § 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1988). The two scenarios are
when the defendants are jointly liable or in a claim against the state. Id.
1'o Id.
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gardless of any percentage of fault.' 5'
Occasionally following verdict, a judgment will be un-
collectible. Connecticut152 and Minnesota15 3 will both al-
low a reallocation according to the original percentages
within a specified time in an uncollectible situation. Thus
if a defendant was originally twenty percent at fault, he or
she will be forced to pay twenty percent of the amount
which a codefendant cannot pay. This conceivably bene-
fits the plaintiff faced with a potentially uncollectible dam-
age award.
The 117th General Assembly of Ohio passed a broadly-
based tort reform bill in October 1987.154 A significant
portion of the bill abolished joint and several liability for
non-economic losses.1 55  Defendants remain subject to
joint and several liability for economic losses. 156 The new
reforms apply, however, only if contributory negligence
or implied assumption of the risk has been successfully
asserted against the claimant. 57  In 1986, the state of
Washington also passed sweeping tort reform. 58 In fault
actions, defendants face several liability unless the trier of
1,5 Id.
1-1 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1987). The time allowed is one year. § 52-
572h(g). The statute reads in part as follows: "the court shall determine whether
all or part of a party's proportionate share of the awarded economic damages and
non-economic damages is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate such
uncollectible amount among the other parties according to their perspective per-
centages of negligence ...." Id.
15, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (West 1988). The time allowed is not later than
one year from judgment. Id.
- 1987 Ohio Laws H.B. 1, as amended. The effective date was January 5,
1988.
155 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson Supp. 1987). The language
states in part for non-economic loss, "each party against whom the judgment is
entered is liable to the complainant only for the proportionate share of that party
.... Id.
156 See id.
'5 § 2315.19(D)(1). Ohio's view takes into consideration that the claimant
should be entitled to full common law joint and severial liability when he or she
has not contributed to his or her own injury. See id.
'58 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (1988). For an extensive discussion of
Washington tort reform, see Development in the Law, The 1986 Washington Tort Re-
form Act, 23 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 211 (1987); Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort Reform
Act: Partial Tort Settlements After the Demise of Joint and Several Liability, 22 GoNz. L.
REV. 67 (1986) (theoretical discussion of partial settlement and liability schemes).
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fact determines the plaintiff has no fault.' 5 9 Defendants
are jointly and severally liable in this situation.' 61 Ore-
gon 16 1 and New Jersey 16 2 also enacted reforms in 1987.
Oregon provides several liability for non-economic dam-
ages 63 and for other occasions when the defendant's per-
centage of fault is less than fifteen percent or less than the
plaintiff's.' 64 The Senate Judiciary Committee Statement
explains the New Jersey changes.' 65
In California, the state known for its innovations, voters
approved a referendum commonly known as Proposition
51 on June 3, 1986,166 reflecting popular desire to modify
tort law in that state.' 67 Proposition 51 abolishes joint
and several liability, but only for non-economic dam-
ages. 168 California courts have been busy interpreting the
'" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (1988).
Io d. However the statute also states "[a] party shall be responsible for the
fault of another person or for payment of the proportionate share of another
party where both were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent
or servant of the party." § 4.22.070(l)(a).
'6' OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1988).
162 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Supp. 1988).
63 § 18.485(2).
"-4 § 18.485(3), (4).
,6 The Committee Statement, reprinted at N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.3
(West Supp. 1988), states in part:
This bill modifies "joint and several liability" so that only a defend-
ant determined to be 607o or more responsible for damages would
be liable for the total amount of the award. A defendant found to be
more than 20% but less than 60% responsible for the damages
would be responsible for the total amount of any economic loss but
only that percentage of the noneconomic loss directly attributable to
his negligence. A defendant found to be 20% or less responsible for
the damages would be liable only for the percentage of the award
directly attributable to his negligence. This modification would not
be applicable to cases involving environmental torts where a plaintiff
could still recover the full award from any defendant found liable.
Id.
166 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1988). This statute was "added by § 4
of Initiative Measure, approved by the People, June 3, 1986." Id.
,67 See, e.g., Green v. Franklin, 190 Cal. App. 3d 93, 235 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1987)
(discussion of the background of the new statute), appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 447
(1987).
-" Kelley, supra note 109, at 52. Moreover, the new California statute states in
part:
In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful
death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of
COMMENTS
provisions of Proposition 5 1, including its retroactive ef-
fects.' 69 California law had been the bellwether for the
retention of joint and several liability following adoption
of comparative negligence. 170
The Texas tort reform legislation, passed in a Special
Legislative Session, 17' is one of the most complex and all-
encompassing of any activity to date. This bill addressed
frivolous pleadings and claims, comparative responsibility
(including amount of recovery, joint liability, etc.), contri-
bution, exemplary damages, liability of drug manufactur-
ers and sellers, governmental liability, and prejudgment
interest. 72 As part of the comparative responsibility leg-
islation, the legislature amended the rules of joint and
several liability so that a defendant is liable only for his
percentage of responsibility unless found specifically
jointly and severally liable. 173 The statute continues by
expressly enumerating the areas where joint and several
liability is retained. 174 These areas include (1) where the
claimant is zero percent liable and the defendant is more
than ten percent liable; or (2) where the percentage of re-
sponsibility of the defendant is greater than twenty per-
cent, and in a negligence action, the defendant is more
responsible than the claimant; or (3) a defendant is also
jointly and severally liable if the injuries or death are
each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and
shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount
of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct pro-
portion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judg-
ment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.
§ 1431.2.
1-6 This law applies to claims which accrue on or after its effective date of June
4, 1986. Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102
(1986); see also Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 116, 236
Cal. Rptr. 224 (1987) (note 6).
17) American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d
578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978) (diminish amount the defendants
pay by the plaintiffs own percentage only; joint and several liability is
compatible).
171 See 1987 Tex Gen. Laws ch. 2 (First Called Session).
172 Id.
171 TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-33.015 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
174 § 33.013(a)-(c).
1988] 649
650 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
caused by a toxic tort. 75
3. The consequences of eliminating joint and several liability
Ralph Nader and several legal commentators 76 state
that abolition of joint and several liability harms the in-
jured person because if a responsible defendant cannot
pay, plaintiff's recovery is reduced. 77 He notes also that
common law "has long recognized that it is fairer [sic] to
allow an innocent victim to fully and promptly recover for
injuries suffered, and let the wrongdoers decide among
themselves, after the victim is compensated, how to ap-
portion the liability."'17 8 Some commentators believe that
insurance rates and transaction costs will actually increase
with elimination of joint and several liability.' 70
However, other commentators point out that predict-
ability is an absolute must if insurance costs are to ever be
controlled. t 0 When potential liability can be assessed
with foresight, risks can be minimized with effective use of
insurance.' 8' The curtailment ofjoint and several liability
is widely recognized as an effective way to bring back a
measure of predictability and reliability to tort lawsuits. 8 2
Public sector defendants in particular have a significant
concern for decreasing their liability. Public entities are
often required to pay entire judgments, even though their
respective liability may only be minor.183  This deep
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., Phillips, Future Implications of the National Tort Reform Movement, 22
GONZ. L. REV. 277, 284-285 (1986). This commentator calls the idea regressive
because she believes it will trench substantially on vital consumer interests with-
out conferring apparent corresponding social benefits.
177 Nader, supra note 44, at 16.
17I ld. at n.8.
'7 Id.; see also Talmadge and Petersen, supra note 2, at 264-65 (will require un-
necessary impleading of parties and cause more proceedings and longer delays).
' Badley, supra note 35, at 12.
Id. at 11-12.
182 See Willard, supra note 36, at 118. The Reagan Administration's Tort Policy
Working Committee recommended the elimination of joint and several liability
(in all situations except where tortfeasors have acted in concert) as part of its com-
prehensive reforms. Id.
1'9 See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (July,
pocket recovery affects all people through increased taxes
and/or decreased public services.
Thus, the justifications for modification of joint and
several liability theory mirror those for the basic tort re-
form movement. 8 4 Of particular concern will be the ef-
fect on large tort litigation. For example, in the toxic tort
area, joint and several liability rules may still be in effect.
In ordinary negligence suits, such as car or airline acci-
dents, the new rules might apply. For those states which
have not submitted to the political pressures of the tort
reform movement, or for those which have submitted but
desire to make "technical corrections," which combina-
tion is the most effective for modification of the joint and
several liability theory?
IV. A MODEL STATUTE FOR EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY THEORY
A. Characteristic of the Model Statute
As stated earlier, the theory ofjoint and several liability
can be defined simply as a doctrine which allows a claim-
ant, or judgment creditor, to seek collection of a judg-
ment from his choice' of the defendants, or judgment
debtors. 8 5 Such an all or-nothing rule cannot, however,
exist in modern society without limitation. The "best" or
"model" statute therefore starts with the common law no-
tions ofjoint and several liability as defined 8 6 and simply
restricts its applicability. It is in the nature of these re-
1985). However, President Habush of the Association of Trial Lawyers states:
"Isn't it unfair that a defendant who is one percent liable has to pick up the tab for
an entire award, because the other defendants are broke? I say to that: Yes, that
would be unfair. But show me a case - show me one case - where that has
happened." Habush, The Tort System Under Fire: Don't Fix What Ain't Broke, 34 FED.
B. NEWS &J. 119, 123 (1987).
184 See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
185 See Harris, supra note 158, for a discussion of the ramifications of eliminat-
ing joint and several liability as seen through the mind of a Washington state
lawyer.
1"' See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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strictions where the tough legislative decisions need to be
made.
Concerted or conspiratorial action by defendants
should be first enumerated for application of joint and
several liability. If acting in concert, tortfeasors should be
held jointly to pay the judgment, or if the claimant wishes,
held severally to pay on demand. The underlying policy
basis, of course, is fairness. The burden of injury should
fall on those responsible, not on those injured in a con-
certed action.
A second application ofjoint and several liability arises
when the plaintiff is not at fault, in other words, the claim-
ant's percentage of responsibility is zero. 18 7 In practical
terms, there would be a distinction between a defendant
merely being liable for his own percentage of responsibil-
ity and a defendant being liable jointly for the entire
amount when the plaintiff is not at fault.' 88 The "fair-
ness" rationale has greater justification where the fact
finder has determined the plaintiff did not contribute to
his own injuries. When the claimant does not in any man-
ner contribute to his own injuries, he should be free to
seek payment of his adjudicated damages from any liable
"deep pocket".
Third, the model statute would apply joint and several
liability for defendants guilty of intentional torts.' 89 Be-
cause of the prerequisite state of mind of the guilty de-
fendant, culpability commands and supports application
of the joint and several liability theory. Such an applica-
tion cannot easily be enumerated as against policy. In-
deed, usage of the theory in an intentional tort situation
187 The words "claimant," "percentage of responsibility," and "comparative re-
sponsibility" are taken from the new Texas tort reform law. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011 (Vernon Supp. 1988); see infra notes 193-195 and ac-
companying text for definitions of these terms in the model statute.
18- This distinction is a policy driven desire to provide an injured non-liable
party in such circumstances a damage award at the expense of a defendant forced
to pay more than his or her own percentage.
1"8' Intentional torts can be defined as acts by a defendant having a state of mind
which includes the consequences of the acts or omissions. See generally PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 9, at § 8.
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may balance the goals of compensation of the injured and
reaffirmation of society's standards regarding intentional
torts.
Finally, in the model statute joint and several liability
should be applied in toxic torts or those tortious acts in-
volving hazardous substances. Hawaii, for example, has
such an exception. 90 Toxic torts will clearly be a major
player in litigation throughout the remainder of the twen-
tieth century.' 9' Due to the nature and extent of hazard-
ous waste ramifications, a greater degree of liability is
warranted. A plaintiff suffering injuries in this manner
should have the opportunity to seek payment from his
choice of culpable defendants. 192
B. A Model Joint and Several Liability Statute
(1) Title
Rules for Determining Comparative Responsibility
(2) Introductory Statement
In an effort to address the concerns of the public as to
the availability and cost of insurance, to address the con-
cerns of public and private entities concerning unpredict-
able and increasing liability risks, to continue meaningful
redress to individuals who become victims of injuries, and
to restore faith in this State's civil justice system, we the
[Nth Legislature] of the [State of ] do enact the following:
(3) Definitions
a. "Claimant" means a party, including a plaintiff,
counterclaimant, cross-claimant, third-party plaintiff, or
intervenor, seeking recovery of damages. In an action in
9o See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (1987) (torts relating to environmental pol-
lution and toxic and asbestos-related torts).
19, See, e.g., Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental
Carcinegonesis, 90 YALE LJ. 840 (1981); Zimmerman, Minimizing Mass Torts and Mass
Disasters, 91 CASE & COM. 16 (1986).
12 However, some limits such as a minimum percentage of responsibility would
be an appropriate step to prevent a defendant three percent responsible from
having to pay the entire amount. This limitation is reconcilable with the strong
policy arguments outlined in the text by considering a balancing of the conflicting
interests involved.
1988] 653
654 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
which a party seeks recovery of damages for injury to an-
other person, damage to the property of another person,
death of another person, or other harm to another per-
son, "claimant" includes both that other person and the
party seeking recovery of damages.195
b. "Defendant" means a party, including a
counterdefendant, cross-defendant, or third-party de-
fendant, from whom a claimant seeks relief. 194
c. "Percentage of responsibility" means that percent-
age attributed by the trier of fact to each claimant, each
defendant, or each settling person with respect to causing
or contributing to cause in any way, whether by negligent
act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably danger-
ous product, by other conduct or activity violative of the
applicable legal standard, or by any combination of the
foregoing, the personal injury, property damage, death,
or other harm for which recovery of damages is sought. 195
(4) Determination of Percentage of Responsibility
1. The trier of fact, as to each claim being asserted,
shall determine the percentage of responsibility of each of
the following entities or persons:
(a) each claimant;
(b) each defendant; and
(c) each settling person. 96




' Four issues exist in partial settlement cases:
1. Whether the non-settling defendant should receive a credit that
will reduce the claimant's award against him. If he does, the type of
credit he will receive;
2. Whether the settling defendant is discharged from all future lia-
bility for contribution;
3. Whether the settling defendant's right to seek contribution from
a non-settling defendant survives the settlement. If it survives, the
manner of determining the gross amount that the later contribution
action will apportion;
4. Whether either the settling defendant or non-settling defendant
retains the right to assert a vicarious liability claim, or other type
indemnity claim, against the other.
Harris, supra note 158, at 69. Settlement should be addressed by statutory law
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2. If the claimant is not otherwise barred from recov-
ery, 19 7 the court shall reduce the amount of damages to be
awarded to the claimant, with respect to each claim, by the
percentage of the claimant's responsibility as determined
in part 1 for that claim.
3. If the claimant has settled with one or more per-
sons, the court shall further reduce the amount of dam-
ages to be awarded to the claimant, with respect to each
claim, by the sum of the dollar amounts of all
settlements. 9 8
4. A defendant is liable only for the percentage of the
damages found by the trier of fact equal that defendant's
percentage of responsibility. However, each defendant is
jointly and severally liable if: 99
(a) the percentage of responsibility attributed to the
claimant by the trier of fact is zero percent;20 0 or
(b) the claimant's personal injury, property damage, or
death is caused by any hazardous or harmful substance
known as a "toxic tort." This includes, but is not limited
to, depositing, discharging, or releasing hazardous chemi-
cals, hazardous wastes, hazardous hydrocarbons, hazard-
ous radiation substances, or any similarly harmful
substance;20 or
(c) the defendant is guilty of an "intentional tort; ' 20 2 or
(d) the defendants and/or settling parties acted in con-
cert or in a conspiracy. 20 3
separately from joint and several liability. Settlement is beyond the scope of this
comment.
17 Having a percentage of responsibility determined by the trier of fact exceed-
ing the state's contributory or comparative negligence statute (typically 50% or
greater than all the defendants) may bar the claimant.
1 This section is the reason for requiring the trier of fact to determine the
percentages of each settling party.
1- See TEX. Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
200 Thus where the claimant is not found to be at fault in any degree the defend-
ants are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount. See Phillips, supra note
176, at 290.
201 See supra notes 190-192 for a discussion of toxic torts.
202 For a definition of "intentional tort", see supra note 189 and accompanying
text.
20 See also Phillips, supra note 176, at 290.
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5. This section does not create a claim or cause of
action.
V. CONCLUSIONS
"No tort system can completely harmonize the three
principal systemic goals of promoting full recovery by
claimants, encouraging settlements, and enforcing a pro-
portionate sharing of losses among all responsible par-
ties."' 20 4 The commentator who espoused this rather
pessimistic view may in fact be correct. Following exami-
nation of the state laws on joint and several liability, the
policy reasons behind each nuance of the laws, and the
political and economic ramifications which follow, this
comment proposes a model statute to meet each goal as
closely as possible. Nevertheless, such a task is clearly
formidable.2 0 5
Because no state or federal legislative body has been
able to design an efficient, goal-meeting solution, one
then asks if the problems, widely discussed and acknowl-
edged, are being treated with inadequate solutions.
Could the "crisis" or "explosion" be caused by something
other than the insurance industry and plaintiffs bar?
Could there perhaps be problems with the tort system it-
self which go beyond any mention of joint and several
liability?
Systemic alternatives to the tort system are certainly
nothing novel. For example, arbitration systems are com-
mon, even mandatory, in some situations.2 6 The policy
behind this type of alternative dispute resolution is typi-
cally to reduce caseloads and court costs, enhancing the
204 Harris, supra note 158, at 72.
205 See generally Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986) (a discussion of the current status of caseloads, costs, and benefits of litiga-
tion today). This commentator states in part: "we should take America's variform
and changing patterns of litigation as a challenge to explore the central and dis-
tinctive features of this society." Id. at 39.
206 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.06.020 (1988) (the Mandatory Arbitra-
tion Act).
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speed of injured party redress.20 7 The Washington state
scheme, for example, "has proven to be an equitable, less
expensive, and faster means to resolve civil disputes while
reducing court congestion, court costs in case processing,
and litigants' cost. '20 8  Obviously some classes of cases
will not lend themselves to adequate resolution through
arbitration. Additionally, courts, through local rules, may
require settlement, discovery, or pre-trial, conferences,
usually mandated in an effort to promote settlement.209
Settlement, of course, is said to promote justice by de-
creasing transaction costs and time. However, if one joint
tortfeasor settles, how is the remaining joint tortfeasor's
liability effected? The central question resurfaces as a sys-
temic problem with the tort method. Is the real cause for
alarm among tort reform advocates, such as insurance
companies and business enterprises who seek to limit the
proportioning of liability, the structure and goals of tort
jurisprudence? 210
A systematic review of the tort institutional structure in
an effort to equitably and efficiently apportion losses
should begin immediately. On the one hand, a full-blown
joint and several liability rule ensures the claimant will be
fully compensated for any injuries suffered, although at
the possible unfair expense of a defendant. On the other
hand, a half-hearted, somewhat compromise attempt may
not adequately compensate the plaintiff and still cause in-
207 See Talmadge and Petersen, supra note 2, at 269.
200 Id.
209 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (Pre-trial conferences and orders). The Federal
Rules, of course, have been the model for numerous state procedural systems.
21, Compare, O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 17, 21-23 (1986) (recommending workers' compensation-type ap-
proaches and no-fault insurance approaches) with Phillips, In Defense of the Tort
System, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 615 (1985) (the tort system is an "ideal scheme to
protect the rights and interests of the common person."). See generally Sugarman,
Right and Wrong Ways of Doing Away With Commercial Air Crash Litigation: Professor
Chalk's "Market Insurance Plan" and Other No-Fault Follies, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 681,
707 (1987) (advocating social insurance and employee benefits in lieu of tort law
or no-fault solutions); Chalk, A New Proposal For The Reform of Commercial Air Crash
Litigation, 50J. AIR L. & CoM. 219, 239-50 (1985) (advocating structural insurance
instead of tort liability).
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equity to the defendant. Thus, one influential commenta-
tor states:
The systemic critics believe that the social welfare goals of
enterprise liability can best be achieved by scrapping the
tort system in favor of one or more alternative institutions
such as contract, no-fault liability (on the workers' com-
pensation model), private first-party loss insurance, or
government social insurance programs. Others would
radically modify the private law tort system through meas-
ures to simplify and reduce, litigation, or expand use of
class action procedures, to transform private' tort law into
a fundamentally different "public law" system. 211
Because many courts have recently adopted enterprise lia-
bility212 in lieu of the fault approach,2 1 3 the tort system in
its traditional role cannot adequately address the needs of
the public and insurance societies. The resulting over-
reaching creates increased transaction costs, 2 1 4 making in-
surance rates prohibitive for business, particularly small
businesses and closely held corporations. 21 5 Thus the de-
terrence effect becomes significantly overblown, render-
ing an equitable apportionment of losses impracticable
and unnecessary. Ironically, judicial expansions of tort lia-
211 Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184,
185 (1987). Mr. Stewart is the Byrne Professor of Administrative Law at Harvard
University School of Law. During 1986-87, Professor Stewart served on the
faculty of the University of Chicago School of Law, widely known for its espousal
of the market driven approach to social justice.
212 Enterprise liability is considered a risk device. Business enterprises, when
faced with increasing liability and insurance costs, will pass along these costs to
the consumer through higher prices. Likewise, the higher costs will reduce con-
sumer demand, thus decreasing the number of injuries and corresponding costs
to society. Id. at 186.
211 "[T]ort law has become a system of compulsory insurance that converts the
risk of a large loss to a few individuals into a small surcharge borne by each con-
sumer of the goods and services that the enterprise produces. This system assert-
edly reduces the costs of risk bearing and in so doing increases social welfare." Id.
at 187.
214 Transaction and administrative costs increase in large measure due to the
shift to third-party insurance. The underlying incorrect assumption here is that
enterprises are better insurers. Id. at 188.
21'1 The vast awards of punitive damages and other non-economic awards has
caused consumers to purchase more insurance than they would probably volunta-
rily choose, thus enhancing administrative costs. Id.
1988] COMMENTS i 659
bility has not realistically promoted the sociological goals
behind its purpose.
The tort system contains important strengths as a social
and economic policy institution. A major drawback to the
system, however, is the lack of adequate measures to ef-
fectively (1) apportion losses among joint tortfeasors, and
(2) allocate the costs of deterrence in society. The proper
solution, therefore, must include the positive features of
the current institution but also effective mechanisms to
apportion and deter. It is in this manner that the "crisis"
in tort and accident law, and thus in joint and several lia-
bility, must be ultimately addressed. The proposed
model statute coupled with explorations into revolution-
ary private tort law systems should be the first step to-
wards a long-term solution.
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